Big brother and little brother: The future of privacy

Mark Ryan University of Birmingham

17th May 2011


























4 kB 1 MHz 1981

4 kB 13 MHz 2003









Ihr Abendme Täglich ab

Frühlingssalate n und Parmesan in Taglick all 18 and 180y

Frühlingsvalate mit Wildkrauter und Parmesan im Speckmantal

Vanille-Zander auf Topinambur-Rhabarber mit Lavendelund Kartoffelpüree

> Schmandtörtchen mit Holunderragout

dazu pro Boni

The future



Vint Cerf co-inventor of TCP/IP ACM Turing Award 2004 Vice president, chief Internet evangelist, Google



Eric Schmidt former CEO of Google




Steve Jobs chairman and CEO of Apple Inc.



Mark Zuckerberg CEO, co-founder of Facebook














2. Cyber-physical systems

Cyber-physical systems integrate the physical world into the electronic world

 They allow us to electronically manage and interact with the physical world. Physical objects are seamlessly integrated into the information network.

Applications

Industry: aerosp., autom., chemical plants, transp., farming


Daily life: healthcare, traffic mgt, finding your wallet, finding

your grandmother

Billions of sensors (RFID, temp., web cams, Geiger ctrs., seismic); Everything is tagged at manufacture time (clothes, food packets, cups, keys, phones, pets, people, verhicles, tools)

The Internet of things

Cyber-physical systems integrate the physical world into the electronic world



The Internet of things

3. Cloud computing





























enables...

What all this





- Met her at INFOSEC'28.
- Works on public key crypto.
- Student at UoB, 2026-29.
- Did project on image analysis.
- · Works for IBM.
- Participates on EU FP14 project "AVANTSSAR".



"Simply speak a question, or just think it, and an answer will return from a vast, collectively produced data matrix. Google queries will seem quaint."

David Kirkpatrick, 2006 CNN Fortune senior editor

Privacy









What privacy is

Restrictions on the processing and dissemination of information related to you.

- Privacy of communication
 - e-mail, 'phone calls, text messages, IMs, Facebook messages
- Privacy of behaviour
 - where you go, what you do, pages you visit
- Privacy of personal records
 - docs, photos, transactions, contributions, archives
 - health records, personnel records, judgements, reviews

Threat from

Threat from

Big brother

Governments

Threat from

Big brother

Governments

Middle brother

Corporations

Little brother

Individuals

Threat from	Official
Big brother Governments	
Middle brother Corporations	
Little brother Individuals	

Threat from	Official	Unofficial
Big brother Governments		
Middle brother Corporations		
Little brother Individuals		

Threat from	Official	Unofficial
Big brother Governments	Governments that have access to databases	
Middle brother Corporations		
Little brother Individuals		

Threa	t from	Official	Unofficial
Big br	other	Governments that have access to databases transport	
Govern		About 440,000 requests by the polic other permitted organisations to mo emails and text messages were requestin 2005-06 in the UK.	nitor telephone calls,
 There are 563 such permitted organisations. The "Intercept Modernisation Programme" is a UK Government initiative to centralise electronic communicati traffic data in the UK in a single database. 		amme" is a UK lectronic communications	
		To combat terrorism, MI5 and MI6 laccess to Transport for London's "O	<u> </u>

Little brother

Individuale

Threat from	Official	Unofficial
Big brother Governments	Governments that have access to databases	
Middle brother Corporations	Companies that offer services Transp./comms./financial Gmail/Hotmail/Yahoo m. Google docs Facebook Easychair	
Little brother Individuals		

Threat from	Official	Unofficial
Big brother Governments	Governments that have access to databases	
Middle brother Corporations	Companies that offer services Transp./comms./financial Gmail/Hotmail/Yahoo m. Google docs Facebook Easychair	
Little brother Individuals	Neighbours, friends and strangers who point their phones at you watch your facebook page	

Threat from Official



The Telegraph

Search - enhanced by Google 0

Big b

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Jobs Dating Offers

Facebook users warned of burglary risk

Users of social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter have been warned by police after two men were convicted of burgling a house whose owners had advertised the fact they were away.





While fans of social media like to post broadcast every move.

police said it can have a highly detrimental effect as it leaves

And now insurers are warning they face higher insurance

premiums if they were the victims of crime having publicised

Facebook News » UK News »

Twitter » Crime »

IN TECHNOLOGY

THE TELEGRAPH ON FACEBOOK »

The Telegraph on Facebook

Facebook users warned of burglary risk Photo: AP

By Nick Britten 4:41PM BST 15 Sep 2010 Comments

Facebook com email eBay

TECHNOLOGY MOST VIEWED address for sale on

TODAY PAST WEEK PAST MONTH 1. John James Audubon's birth celebrated by Google doodle

2. Sony to challenge Apple with two tablet computers

3 End of an era as last mechanical typewriters are sold

MySpace surrenders to Facebook

Little their homes at the mercy of criminals.

being away.

Wisbech magistrates' court heard that Peter Trower, 22 and

4. Party death schoolgirl learned about drugs on web, says teacher 5. Google accused of representing Rio de

Threat from	Official	Unofficial
Big brother Governments	Governments that have access to databases	Governments that spy on their people
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By: Clint Boulton 2010-11-29

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Manage Efficiency

with Virtualization

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There are 0 user comments on this IT Security & Network Security News & Reviews story.

Wikileaks gave the New York Times a diplomatic cable that shows the Chinese government was responsible for the hack on Google's Gmail system.

China's government was indeed behind the hack on Google's Gmail system earlier this year according to a cable captured by the controversial Wikileaks organization.

Wikileaks, which butters its bread collecting secret documents and seeding them in media outlets, snagged 250,000 American diplomatic cables dating back three years and released

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
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
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
some of them to the New York Times and other media outlets.

The Times cited one of the cables as proof that "China's Politburo directed the intrusion into Google's computer systems in that country, a Chinese contact told

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Thr	eat from	Official	Unofficial
		Governments that have access to	Governments that spy on their
Big			
Gov			
	Web s	earches	
	• si	ngle men in their 60s	
		og that urinates on	be-
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Cor		everal people with	p.
Cor		ırname Arnold	Thelma Arnold,
		ndscapers in Lilburn,	62 from Lilburn,
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			her three dogs.
Litt	her	O maint thair about at our	
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Indi	viduals	- water your facebook page	

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Threat from	Official	Unofficial
	Governments that have access to	Governments that spy on their
Big brot	Union européenne	
Governn	République française	
Middle	N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N	your be-
brother		tw. op.
Corpora ⁻	PASSEPORT	2 de 3 de
Little		you D tags
brother	point their phones at you	Tracking your phone
Individuals	 watch your facebook page 	



Scott McNealy, CEO Sun Microsystems, 1999



Scott McNealy, CEO Sun Microsystems, 1999 "Consumer privacy issues are a red herring. You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it."



Larry Ellison, CEO Oracle, 2001



Larry Ellison, CEO Oracle, 2001

"All you have to give up is your illusions. Right now, you can go onto the Internet and get a credit report about your neighbour, find out where he works and how much he earns."







Mark Zuckerberg, CEO Facebook, 2010



"Privacy is no longer a social norm. People are comfortable sharing more information, and different kinds,

and with more people."

Is that true?

Is that true? Do people want privacy,

and if so, why?

People do want privacy, in order to avoid...

- incorrect conclusions, resulting from deliberate or accidental errors in the data, or misinterpretations, or prejudice
- blackmail or extortion, or other abuse of power
- commercial pestering (spam)

Privacy concerns all aspects of live, including past relationships, political views, financial affairs, past deeds, and also the trivia of everyday life.

People do want privacy, in order to avoid...

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- commercial pestering (spam)

Privacy concerns all aspects of live, including past relationships, political views, financial affairs, past deeds, and also the trivia of everyday life.

Problem: people might abuse privacy to do bad things...

- commit fraud, evade taxes
- trade in child pornography images
- commit terrorism, to kill or injure without being detected
- commandeer a botnet to take down Google

The privacy challenge

- How to balance
 - privacy and accountability
 - individual privacy and societal security
- How to build systems that support this balance?
- (Legislation is important too)

Vision

To design, build and evaluate technologies that support appropriate kinds of privacy.

Examples:

- absolute
- relative to interrogator
- verifiable-conditional

Vision

To design, build and evaluate technologies that support appropriate kinds of privacy.

Examples:

- absolute
- relative to interrogator
- verifiable-conditional

Example: your vote.

To ensure free and fair elections, your vote should be completely private to you.

It should not be accessible by potentially corrupt election officials, programmers, administrators, or indeed anyone, ever.

Vision

To design, build and evaluate technologies that support appropriate kinds of privacy.

Examples:

- absolute
- relative to interrogator
- verifiable-conditional

Example: e-mail, Facebook, online documents.

Typically, we want data to be confidential from the service provider, while still allowing the provider to route the data to the intended receiver.

Can be very hard to achieve.

Vision

To design, build and evaluate technologies that support appropriate kinds of privacy.

Examples:

- absolute
- relative to interrogator
- verifiable-conditional

Example: Oyster card usage, mobile phone usage, ISP logs.


Data may be accessed only by authorised agents, and only under certain conditions. The presence/absence of the conditions and of the access are verifiable by the user.

privacy-enhancing

technology

1. The TPM as a

The trusted platform module



Digital rights management



configuration repor



Richard Stallman Creator of GNU, Emacs, GCC, GPL, the Free Software Foundation

"With a plan they call trusted computing, large media corporations, together with computer companies such as Microsoft and Intel, are planning to make your computer obey them instead of you."

He calls it "treacherous computing".




Ross Anderson
Professor of Computer
Security, University of
Cambridge

- "TC can support remote censorship. In its simplest form, applications may be designed to delete pirated music under remote control."
- "In 2010 President Clinton may have two red buttons on her desk one that sends the missiles to China, and another that turns off all the PCs in China."

He also talks of commercial bullying, economic warfare and political censorship.

Attestation from cloud





What we are doing about the TPM

 Improvements to its specification



 Developing languages for describing its behaviour and verifying its properties




 Developing methods for using it in cloud-based applications



$$\begin{aligned} & \text{and } H' = H \land \mathsf{message}(\phi_0, \rho(M), x) \\ & [& [\inf(M, x); Q] \rho H \ell \phi \mathsf{true} \\ & = [& [Q] (\rho \cup \{x \mapsto x\}) (H \land \mathsf{message}(\phi, \rho(M), x)) (x :: \ell) \phi \mathsf{true} \\ & [& [\det(M, N); Q] \rho H \ell \phi \mu \\ & = \{H \Rightarrow \mathsf{message}(\phi, \rho(M), \rho(N))\} \cup [& [Q] \rho H \ell \phi \mu \\ & [& [\det x = g(M_1, \ldots, M_n) \text{ in } \\ & Q_1 \operatorname{else} Q_2] \rho H \ell \phi \mu \\ & = \bigcup \Big\{ [& [Q_1] ((\rho\sigma) \cup \{x \mapsto y'\sigma'\}) (H\sigma) (\ell\sigma) (\phi\sigma) \mu \mid \\ & g(p_1', \ldots, p_n') \to p' \in \operatorname{de} f(g) \operatorname{and} (\sigma, \sigma') \operatorname{mgus} \operatorname{and} \\ & M_1 \rho \sigma = p_1' \sigma', \ldots, M_n \rho \sigma = p_n' \sigma' \Big\} \cup [& [Q_2] \rho H \ell \phi \mu \\ & [& [\inf M = N \text{ then } Q_1 \\ & \operatorname{else} Q_2] \rho H \ell \phi \mu \\ & = [& [Q_1] (\rho\sigma) (H\sigma) (\ell\sigma) (\phi\sigma) \mu \cup [& [Q_2] \rho H \ell \phi \mu \\ & \text{where } \sigma = \operatorname{mgu}(\rho(M), \rho(N)) \\ & [& \operatorname{lock}; Q] \rho H \ell \phi \operatorname{false} \\ & = [& [Q_1] (\rho \cup \{vs_1 \mapsto vs_1, \ldots, vs_n \mapsto vs_n\}) H \ell \phi_0 \operatorname{fute} \\ & \text{where } \phi_0 = (vs_1, \ldots, vs_n), \text{ with } vs_1, \ldots, vs_n \\ & \text{unlock}; Q] \rho H \ell \phi \operatorname{false} \\ & = [& [Q] \rho H \ell \phi \operatorname{false} \\ & = [& [Q] \rho H \ell \phi \operatorname{false} \\ & \cup \{H \land \operatorname{message}(\phi_0, vc, vm) \Rightarrow \operatorname{message}(\phi_1, vc, vm)) \\ & \cup \{H \land \operatorname{attacker}(\phi_0, vm), \Rightarrow \operatorname{attacker}(\phi_1, vm)\} \\ & \text{where } \phi_0 = (vs_1, \ldots, vs_{i-1}, \rho(M), vs_{i+1}, \ldots, vs_n), \\ & \text{and } \phi_1 = (vs_1, \ldots, vs_{i-1}, \rho(M), vs_{i+1}, \ldots, vs_n), \\ & \text{and } \phi_1 = (vs_1, \ldots, vs_{i-1}, \rho(M), vs_{i+1}, \ldots, vs_n) \\ \end{aligned}$$





with $vs_1, \ldots, vs_n, vc, vm$ fresh



 $[\![\text{read } s_i \text{ as } x; Q]\!] \rho H\ell \phi \text{false} = [\![Q]\!] (\rho \cup \{x \mapsto vs_i, vs_1 \mapsto vs_1, \dots, vs_i \mapsto vs_i, \dots, vs_n \mapsto vs_n, \dots, vs_n \mapsto vs_n \mapsto$

 $= [Q](\rho \cup \{vc \mapsto vc, vm \mapsto vm\})H\ell\phi'\mathsf{true}$ $\cup \{H \land \mathsf{message}(\phi, vc, vm) \Rightarrow \mathsf{message}(\phi', vc, vm)\}$

 $[s_i := M : Q] \rho H \ell \phi true$

EasyChair: the little Facebook



#confs
2
3
7
66
276
629
1312
2183
3306
>3690
>161
>5

EasyChair data about Mark Ryan, 2005-2011

Reviewed papers by A.Gordon (CSF'11), D.Ghica (FCS'11), G.Steel (ESORICS'10), M.Fisher (FM'10), P.Panagaden (LICS'09), and others. Recommended *reject* for all of them.

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
25	number of papers submitted
17	number of papers accepted
0.68	Acceptance rate
107	number of papers reviewed
24	number of times recommended accept
28%	Recomendation agr. w. outcome

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28%	Recomendation agr. w. outcome
0.2	Probability CSF 2012 re-invites him
$2^{-11.2}$	Prob. will win ACM Turing award



2. Electronic voting

Electronic voting potentially offers

- efficiency
 - higher voter participation
 - greater accuracy
 - lower costs
- better security
 - vote-privacy even in presence of corrupt election authorities
 - voter verification, i.e. the ability of voters and observers to check the declared outcome against the votes cast.








Examples of people voting

Desired properties



What we are doing in electronic voting

 Developing solutions that achieve these combinations of properties



 Developing methods for describing its properties, and verifying solutions against them



Incoercibility:

VP is coercion resistant if there exists a process V' such that for any $C = \text{new } c_1.\text{new } c_2.(_ \mid P)$ satisfying

•
$$\tilde{n} \cap fn(C) = \emptyset$$

•
$$S[C[V_A\{^?/_V\}^{c1,c2}] \mid V_B\{^a/_V\}] \approx_{\ell} S[V_A\{^c/_V\}^{chc} \mid V_B\{^a/_V\}]$$

we have

- $C[V']^{\operatorname{out}(chc,\cdot)} \approx_{\ell} V_A\{a/v\},$



Verifiability:

Soundness

$$\forall i, j. \quad \Phi^{IV}(v_i, r_i, y) \land \Phi^{IV}(v_j, r_j, y) \Rightarrow i = j$$
 (1)

$$\Phi^{UV}(\tilde{v}, \tilde{y}, p) \wedge \Phi^{UV}(\tilde{v}', \tilde{y}, p) \Rightarrow \tilde{v} \simeq \tilde{v}'$$
(2)

$$\bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{S}} \Phi^{IV}(v_i, r_i, y_i) \wedge \Phi^{UV}(\tilde{v}', \tilde{y}, p) \Rightarrow \tilde{v} \simeq \tilde{v}'$$

$$\Phi^{EV}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{y}, p) \wedge \Phi^{EV}(\tilde{w}', \tilde{y}, p) \Rightarrow \tilde{w} \simeq \tilde{w}'$$
(4)

$$\bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq n} \Phi^{IV}(v_i, w_i, r_i, y_i) \wedge \Phi^{EV}(\tilde{w}', \tilde{y}, p) \Rightarrow \tilde{w} \simeq \tilde{w}'$$



(3)


$$\Phi^{EV}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{y}, p) \wedge \Phi^{EV}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{y}', p') \Rightarrow \tilde{y} \simeq y'$$
(6)

$$\bigwedge_{1 \le i \le n} \Phi^{IV}(v_i, w_i, r_i, y_i) \wedge \Phi^{UV}(\tilde{v}, \tilde{y}, p) \wedge \Phi^{EV}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{y}, p)$$
(7)










































































































































Big brother and little brother

Big brother and little brother



Big, middle and little brother (?)



